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JOSHUA VINCENT 
CaMPARA TIVE LAW AND RELIGION A WR 
PROFESSOR CATHERINE Me CAULIFF 
HISTORICAL, RELIGIOUS AND SCHOLASTIC PROHIBITION OF USURY: 
THE COMMON ORIGINS OF WESTERN AND ISLAMIC FINANCIAL PRACTICES 
Few practices have been so universally abhorred as usury. Through the ages, 
usury has been condemned by prophets, priests, philosophers, and poets of all nations.1 It 
has often been regarded as one of the vilest of crimes. The Hebrew prophet Ezekiel 
included usury with rape, murder, robbery, and idolatry in a list of "abominable things" 
that would receive the punishment of God? In the Middle Ages, Christian scholars 
debated whether usury should be considered extortion, a form of robbery, or a sin against 
charity and the Holy Spirit.3 
The origins and evolution of usury are extremely interesting from the perspective 
of many disciplines--economics, religion, law, etc. Usury is derived from the Medieval 
Latin term "usuria," which means "interest" or "excessive interest," and originally meant 
charging a fee for the use ofmoney.4 It was actively banned and shunned well before the 
emergence ofthe Abraharnic religions of Judaism,5 Christianity, and Islam, all of which 
1 JAMES M. ACKERMAN, INTEREST RATES AND THf: LAW: A HISTORY OF USURY, 1981 ARIZ. 
ST. L.J. 61 (1981). 
2 Ezekie/18:10-13 (Revised Standard Version). 
3 ACKERMAN, supra note I, at 61. 
4 THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1895 (4TH ED., 
2006). 5 THE TORAH AND LATER SECTIONS OF THE HEBREW BIBLE CRITICIZE INTEREST-TAKING, 
BUT INTERPRETATIONS OF THE BIBLICAL PROHIBITION VARY. ONE COMMON 
UNDERSTANDING IS THAT JEWS ARE FORBIDDEN TO CHARGE INTEREST UPON LOANS MADE 
prohibited usury as well. 6 The legal origins on the prohibition of usury can be traced back 
to the Code ofHammurabi in 1760 BC.7 It is also frowned upon in Hindu law which 
predates 400 BC,8 even Plato spoke out against usury.9 This tradition carried into the 
J udeo-Christian-Islamic prohibition. 
The definitional approach to prohibiting usury centers on distinguishing which 
transactions constitute the lending of money for a profit. 10 The best known example in the 
ancient world of this approach is Israel, which outlawed usury among Israelites but 
permitted it if the borrowers were foreigners.'' The scholastic theory, which dominated 
European thought on usury from the fourth century until the sixteenth century, was a 
TO OTHER JEWS, BUT ALLOWED TO CHARGE INTEREST ON TRANSACTIONS WITH NON-JEWS, 
OR GENTILES. 
6 C. H. BECKER, TRANSLATION OF CHRISTENTUM UND ISLAM (1909), REPRINTED IN 
CHRISTIANITY AND ISLAM 67 (LENOX HILL PUB. & DIST. Co. 1974). 
7 THE CODE OF HAMMURABI (also known as HAMMURABI'S CODE OR CODEX 
HAMMURABI), was written ca. 1760 BC in ancient Mesopotamia. See, MARC VAN DE 
MIEROOP, KING HAMMURABI OF BABYLON: A BIOGRAPHY 99-111 (2005). The new code 
was not only Babylonian law, but also one of the first written codes oflaw in recorded 
history. The Code was created by Prince Hammurabi (ca. 1810 BCE- 1750 BCE), a first 
dynasty king of the city-state of Babylon who inherited the throne from his father, Sin-
muballit, in 1792 BC. Hammurabi believed himself to be specially chosen by the gods 
(i.e. the sun god Shamash) to convey the law to his people. The Code contained 275-300 
laws written on 12 tablets. It is often cited as the first example of the legal concept that 
there are some basic laws that no one can change, not even a king. It is also very 
specifically structured so that each crime is given a specific punishment. These 
punishments were the bases of the modem day "eye for eye, tooth for tooth" philosophy. 
The code also serves as one of the earliest examples of the ideas of "presumption of 
innocence," and that evidence must be presented against an accused. The fact that the law 
was written was important in itself because it implied that they were indisputable. 
8 WAYNE A.M. VISSER & ALASTAIR MACINTOSH, A SHORT REVIEW OF THE HIS1'0RICAL 
CRITIQUf: OF USURY, 8 ACCT., Bus., & FIN. HISTORY 175, 176 (1998). 
9 Usury (in the original sense of any interest) was denounced by a number of spiritual 
leaders and philosophers of ancient times, including Plato, Aristotle, Cato, Cicero, 
Seneca, Plutarch, Aquinas, Muhammad, Moses, Philo and Gautama Buddha. !d. 
10 BRIAN M. MCCALL, UNPROFITABLE LENDING: MODERN CREDIT REGULATION AND THE 
LOST THWRYOF USURY, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 549,557 (2008). 
11 SIDNEY HOMER & RICHARD SYLLA,A HISTORY OF INTEREST RATES 21 (4th ed. 2005). 
more nuanced version of the ancient Israeli approach. 12 Contemporary to the scholastic 
theory, Islam developed a very similar theory of usury which survives into the modern 
age.l3 
The Islamic approach begins with severe condemnations in religious texts of 
taking riba in connection with a loan. 14 Scholars debate the correct translation of riba as 
either usury or interest, 15 which may be due to the historical change in meaning of these 
terms in the West. 16 Yet, the Islamic condemnations do not condemn business and 
commerce (or trading), which is distinguished from taking riba. 17 Over the centuries 
Islamic jurisprudence has developed forms of investment in businesses, such as joint 
ventures, limited partnerships, insurance arrangements, sale-leaseback transactions, and 
higher purchase prices on credit sales, which comply with the prohibition of riba. 18 These 
transactions are often distinguished from riba by Islamic jurists on the basis of changes in 
risk sharing (compared to a loan), profit to the financier being based on the productivity 
12 The exact dates are obviously not fixed. I am constructing a border around the period 
of the scholastic theory beginning with the condemnation of usury by the Council of 
Nicaea in 325 and ending with the passage of the ACTE AGAINST USURYE, 1545, 37 
HENRY VIII c. 9 (ENG.), which allowed loans charging up to 10 percent. See JOHN T. 
NOONAN, JR., THE SCHOLASTIC ANALYSIS OF USURY 15 (HARVARD U. PRESS 1957); 
NORMAN JONES, GOD AND THE MONEYLENDERS 48 (1989). The scholastic theory is 
described in detail in Part II, infra. 
13 See DANIEL KLEIN, THE ISLAMIC AND JEWISH LAWS OF USURY: A BRIDGE TO 
COMMERCIAL GROWTH AND PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST, 22 DENY. J. INT'L L. & PoL'Y 
535 (1995). 
14 There are a total of eight verses in the Qur'an which condemn taking riba. See Id. at 
536-37. Mohammed is reported as having compared taking riba to committing adultery 
36 times and committing incest with one's mother, which demonstrates the intensity and 
seriousness of the issue in Islamic thought. See id. at 537. 
15 DR. THEODORE KARASIK, FREDERIC WEHREY & STEVEN STROM, ISLAMIC FINANCE IN A 
GLOBAL CONTEXT: 0PPORTUN!TlES AND CHALLENGES, 7 CHI. J. [NT'L L. 379,381 (2007). 
16 McCALL, supra note 10, at 557-58. 
17 See KLEIN, supra note 13, at 536. 
18 KARASIK ET AL., supra note 15, at 383-85. 
of the business financed (rather than a fixed percentage of the amount of money 
provided), and fees for other services (such as purchasing the item sold on credit). 19 
In the United States, the tradition of statutory limitation of interest rates dates 
back to Colonial times.Z° Forty-six states still retain rate ceilings.21 American usury laws 
were modeled on the Statute of Anne (1713),22 itself derived from still earlier legislation 
and debate. Thus, American usury law represents a venerable body of legal, ethical, 
religious, and (sometimes) economic thought, reaching back through the Middle Ages to 
the foundations of western civilization. 23 The social goals, economic consequences, 
criticisms, and proposals for change cannot be fully understood without some 
acquaintance with their context: the legal and economic developments that produced 
them.24 
This paper examines the implications and historical developments of usury based 
upon the "scholastic theory of usury," the jurisprudential approach that dominated 
Western law and ethics for over a millennium. 25 The scholastic theory was rooted in 
ancient religious texts, Aristotelian philosophy, and Roman law contract theory.Z6 It 
argued, under natural law principles, there is fundamental distinction between investing 
capital in a business or wealth-producing assets and lending money to fund consumption, 
19 See id. 
20 McCALL, supra note I 0, at 557-58. 
21 Id. 
22 ACT TO REDUCE RATE OF INTEREST, 12 ANNE, C. 16 (1713); FRANK E. HORACK,A 
SCRVHOFGENERAL USURY LAWS, 8 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 36,36-37 (1941). 
23 ACKERMAN, supra note 1, at 63. 
24 ACKERMAN, supra note 1, at 63. 
25 MCCALL, supra note 10, at 555. 
26 !d. 
the latter was considered violative of commutative justice?7 The scholastic theory also 
noted that the persistence of usury systemically leads to undesirable wealth transfers 
inconsistent with distributive justice.28 
I. Pre-Scholastic Approach to Usury 
A. Ancient Societies 
Lending at interest pre-dates writing and the coining of money by thousands of 
years.29 The earliest recorded loans date from about 3000 B.C., but the practice appears to 
have been ancient by then?0 Interest probably originated during the beginnings of 
agriculture, about 8000 B.C.31 Farming provided people with early forms of lendable 
27 Two quotations from St. Thomas Aquinas can serve as a definition of commutative 
justice. "In the first place there is the order of one part to another, to which corresponds 
the order of one private individual to another. This order is directed by commutative 
justice, which is concerned about the mutual dealings between two persons." 2 ST. 
THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA, PT. II-II, Q. 61, ART.] (FATHERS OF THE 
ENGLISH DOMINICAN PROVINCE TRANS., BENZIGER BROS. 194 7). "[I]n commutations 
something is paid to an individual on account of something of his that has been received, 
as may be seen chiefly in selling and buying, where the notion of commutation is found 
primarily. Hence it is necessary to equalize thing with thing, so that the one person 
should pay back to the other just so much as he has become richer out of that which 
belonged to the other." Id. at pt II-II, q. 61, art. 2. See JACQUES MELITZ, SOME FURTHER 
REASSESSMENT OF THE SCHOLASTIC DOCTRINE OF USURY, IN 24 KYKLOS: INTERNATIONAL 
REVIEW FOR SOCIAL SERVICES 476 N. 3 (1971) ("The usury doctrine, dating mainly from 
1150 to 1350, appeals not to authority and charity, but to 'natural law', therefore to 
reason and commutative justice."). 
28 Again Aquinas can provide a definition of distributive justice: "[T]here is the order of 
the whole towards the parts, to which corresponds the order of that which belongs to the 
community in relation to each single person. This order is directed by distributive justice, 
which distributes common goods proportionately." AQUINAS, supra note 12, at pt. II-II, q. 
61, art. I. 
29 !d. 
30 Id. 
31 !d. 
capital: live- stock, grain, and tools. Loans of seed-grain or breeding stock, in particular, 
produce their own increase and may have suggested the idea of interest. 32 
It was only later, after 8000 B.C., during the Mesolithic Age, and especially after 
5000 B.C., during the Neolithic Age (the dates, of course, are conjectural and differ 
widely for different locations), that capital and credit became important and provided a 
main impetus toward human progress. 33 Mesolithic man went out to find his food?4 
Neolithic man produced his own food through agriculture and animal culture.35 His 
capital took the form of seeds, improved tools, and especially herds of animals?6 Capital 
accumulation led to a great increase in population and the opening up of vast new areas in 
Asia and Europe.37 Such capital permitted the further accumulation of possessions, the 
support of chieftains, and the building of cities. 38 
Cattle probably comprised the first true productive assets or capital of tribes or 
individuals.39 Cattle breeding supplied many financial terms used in later money 
economies.4° For example, there is our own word capital and our term pecuniary, from 
"pecus," meaning a "flock" in Latin.41 As cattle and grain became available and in 
demand in quantities above consumption requirements, they provided a form of primitive 
money; that is to say, they became commodities of sufficient value and uniformity that 
they could conveniently be used as a standard medium of exchange for other 
32 HOMER AND SYLLA, supra note II, at 19. 
33 !d. at 20 
34 !d. 
35 !d. 
36 ACKERMAN, supra note\, at63. 
37 !d. 
38 !d. 
39 HOMER AND SYLLA, supra note II, at 20. 
40 !d. 
41 Id 
commodities.42 Not only could they be loaned out at interest, they also provided a 
standard ofvaluation.43 
B. Early Commercial Societies 
The first written laws come from the Sumerians, a culture already 
advanced commercially.44 On the banks of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers, the Sumerians 
built the world's first urban civilization in the fourth millennium B.C.45 Living in large 
cities such as Ur, they pioneered irrigated farming, architecture, and commerce.46 About 
3000 B.C., Sumerian priests invented cuneiform writing-perhaps in order to keep track of 
temple accounts and commercial transactions.47 Of surviving Sumerian writings, 90% are 
commercial accounts and contracts that contain some of the earliest recordings ofloans 
repayable with interest.48 
In about 2350 B.C., Urukagina, a king of the Sumerian city of Lagash, had his 
scribes record for posterity his exploits and legal reforms (he freed persons imprisoned 
for debt), thus producing the earliest legal code.49 Other rulers adopted the practice, 
recording changes in a body of unwritten, customary law administered by Sumerian 
judges. 5° In about 1750 B.C., the Babylonian king Hammurabi compiled, systematized, 
42 ACKERMAN, supra note I, at 66. 
43 HOMER AND SYLLA, supra note II, at 20. 
44 ld. 
45 ld. at 21. 
46 ld. 
47 ACKERMAN, supra note I, at 66. 
48 JAMES PRITCHARD, ED, ANCIENT NEAR EAST£RN TEXTS RELATING TO TH£ OLD T£STAMENT 
163 (PRINCETON UNIV. PRESS, 3D ED. 1969). 
49 Id. 
50 S. KRAMER, TilE SUMERIANS 87 (1963). 
and expanded upon the earlier systems, creating his famous legal code. 51 Like the 
Sumerian codes, Hanunurabi's was probably a set of changes and additions to an 
unwritten "common law," rather than an attempt to set forth all of the laws of the land. 52 
Hammurabi's Code contains the earliest surviving usury law: 
(§ L] If a merchant has given com on loan, he may take 100 sila of com as 
interest on I gur; if he has given silver on loan he may take 1/6 shekel 6 grains as 
interest on I shekel of silver. 
(§ M] If a man who has raised a loan has no silver to repay it but has com, [the 
merchant] may then take com for his interest (at a rate) in accordance with the 
ordinances of the king; but, if the merchant has increased his interest above [I 00 
sila of com] on lgur [or] over 1/6 shekel 6 grains [on I shekel of silver] and has 
taken (it), he forfeits whatever he has given (on loan). 53 
These measures amount to 20% on loans of silver and 33% on loans of grain. 54 
The rates were apparently customary in the area, dating back for centuries. 55 
Since the Code required contracts to be written, much evidence of Babylonian 
lending practice remains today. 56 Competition was apparently keen, for many loans were 
51 T. AFRICA, THEANCI/oNT WORLD 3 (1969). 
52 Id. 
53 G. DRIVER & J. MILES, THE BABYLONIAN LAWS 39 (1952). The Code also deals with 
other lending abuses such as wrongful retention of security or use of force in collection. 
One section excuses the debtor from payment for a year in case of drought. 
54 Id. 
55 !d. 
transacted at well below the legal rate. 57 As trade became more widespread, the rates set 
by Hammurabi were adopted generally throughout the Middle East. 58 These basic rates 
remained fairly constant for about 1200 years. 59 After the Persian conquest of 539 B.C., 
Babylon declined as a commercial center.60 Normal rates rose towards 40%, and the old 
legal or traditional limits were ignored.61 
1. Greece 
The Greeks of the seventh century B.C. developed an economic system that was 
commercial, urban, and monetary. 62 Credit facilitated trade. The necessities of trade led 
to the Greeks adoption of standardized Babylonian weights and measures, a sort of legal 
tender for the payment of debts and taxes.63 Credit forms were exploited by the Greeks in 
an atmosphere of freedom and laissez faire very different from that of Babylonia. 64 
There was extensive borrowing at interest. The Greeks apparently never 
prohibited interest entirely.65 In the earliest times, custom and kinship ties served to 
moderate the interest charge. Later, the customary rates were established as maximum 
legal limits, usually between 16% and 18%.66 During the seventh and eighth centuries 
56 ACKERMAN, supra note I, at 66. 
57 !d. 
58 !d. See HOMER AND SYLLA, supra note II, at 26. 
59 !d. 
60 Id. 
61 ACKERMAN, supra note I, at 67; HOMER AND SYLLA, supra note II, at 26. 
62 HOMER AND SYLLA, supra note II, at 34. 
63 !d. 
64 Id. 
65 HOMER AND SYLLA, supra note II, at 34. 
66 Id. 
B.C., the Greek economy underwent great changes.67 Spurred by the recent invention of 
coined money and improved navigation, the importance 
of trade grew rapidly.68 The economic changes caused great distress to the 
existing subsistence farming economy.69 Fluctuating prices, inflation, and competition 
from slave labor made small farming only a marginalliving.70 
By 594 B.C., a large portion of the Athenian population was deeply in debt. 71 
Many citizens lost their land and were sold into slavery to pay their creditors. 72 The city 
was threatened with revolt. In this crisis, the poet-orator Solon was called upon to restore 
the situation and given extraordinary powers. 73 Solon cancelled existing land debt, 
prohibited the practice of debt slavery, used state funds to redeem Athenians already 
enslaved, and abolished the legal limits on interest rates. 74 
For several centuries, interest rates in Athens were set solely by the market.75 
Trade prospered. Whether attributable to the free interest or to other factors, Athens 
rapidly outstripped the other commercial cities of Greece. 76 Although beneficial to 
commerce, the uncontrolled interest rates were a hardship on consumer debtors. 77 
Greek philosophers also considered the question of usury-though more 
67 !d. See ACKERMAN, supra note I, at 68. 
68 HOMER AND SYLLA, supra note II, at 34. 
69 ACKERMAN, supra note I, at 68. 
70 HOMER AND SYLLA, supra note II, at 34. 
71 !d. 
72 Id. 
73 HOMER AND SYLLA, supra note II, at 34. 
74 ACKERMAN, supra note I, at 68. 
75 !d. See T. DIVINE, LVTERf:ST II (1959). 
76 ACKERMAN, supra note I, at 68. 
77 !d. 
from a moral than economic perspective.78 Plato felt that the role of the State was to 
instill virtue into its citizens; he thought wealth interfered with the attainment of such 
goodness. 79 To encourage virtue, none should possess more than they need; none less.80 
Plato condemned usurers for not only ignoring the poor, but for "planting their own stings 
into any fresh victim who offers them an opening to inject the poison of their money; and 
while they multiply their capital by usury, they are also multiplying ••• the paupers."81 
Thus, according to Plato, lending at interest increases the gap between the rich and the 
poor, breeds disharmony and turmoil in the citizenry, and should therefore be prohibited 
by law. 82 
Aristotle agreed with his teacher's appraisal of the bad moral effects ofusury_83 In 
addition, he believed that interest was inherently unnatural and unjust. 84 This conclusion 
was based upon Aristotle's analysis of economics. Aristotle stated that the goal of 
economic activity was to satisfY physical requirements such as food and clothing. 85 The 
production of goods to fill these needs is the commendable, "natural" form of money-
making. 86 Farming, stock raising, and manufacturing fall into this category. They produce 
78 ACKERMAN, supra note I, at 69. 
79 PLATO, THE REPUBLIC 280 (F. CORNFORD TRANS. 1945). 
80 Id. at 281 
81 Id. at 280-81. Although disapproving of interest on commercial loans, Plato believed 
that men should pay their debts. He prescribed penalties for default of 200% annually. 
82 JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., TOKOS ANDATOKION: AN EXAMINATION OF THE NATURAL LAW 
REASONING AGAINST USURY AND CONTRACEPTION, 10 NAT. L. F. 215,216 (1965). 
83 Id. at 217. 
84 Id. 
85 Id. 
86 ARISTOTLE, POLITICS 23-24 (B. JOWETT TRANS. 1964). This is what is referred to as the 
"natural law theory of usury". ("The most hated sort, and with the greatest reason, is 
usury, which makes a gain out of money itself, and not from the natural use of it. For 
money was intended to be used in exchange, but not to increase at interest. And this term 
usury (takas, i.e., offspring, produce) which means the birth of money from money, is 
their own "increase" in a natural and beneficial way. Money functions properly as a 
medium of exchange to facilitate the transfer of goods. 87 Commerce, hire, and usury, on 
the other hand, produce nothing that helps satisfy these wants.88 
2. Rome 
The practical Romans refused to let such philosophizing interfere with the 
conduct ofbusiness. 89 They generally steered a middle course, neither forbidding interest 
entirely nor letting the rate go unrestricted.90 The earliest written Roman laws, the 
Twelve Tables of 443 B.C., reduced the previous rate of interest by setting legallimits.91 
The Tables provided for a rate of 8113%, and a penalty of fourfold damages for violation 
thereof.92 
A nation of citizen-farmers, the Romans became suspicious of clever notions like 
interest.93 Several attempts were made to abolish it.94 In 342 B.C., a new law was passed 
which forbade the taking of interest by Roman citizens.95 The law was easily evaded, 
however, by the use of foreign agents, and was soon repealed.96 After the defeat of 
applied to the breeding of money because the offspring resembles the parent. Wherefore 
of all modes of money-making this is the most unnatural."). 
87 ACKERMAN, supra note I, at 69. 
88 !d. 
89 DIVINE, supra note 75, AT 20; HOMER AND SYLLA, supra note II, at 43. 
90 HOMER AND SYLLA, supra note 11, at 44. 
9tH OMER AND SYLLA, supra note 11, at 44 (4th ed. 2005); ACKERMAN, supra note 1, at 
70. 
92 HOMER AND SYLLA, supra note 11, at 44 (4th ed. 2005); ACKERMAN, supra note 1, at 
70. 
93 ACKERMAN, supra note I, at 70. 
94 Id. 
95 !d. 
96 !d. 
Hannibal in 202 B.C., Rome rapidly became the dominant power in the Mediterranean.97 
Commerce, especially sea-trade, became an important and lucrative activity. In 88 B.C., 
the dictator Sulla raised the usury limit to 12%, an official rate that endured for over 500 
years.98 The efficacy of the interest ceiling, however, seems to have been slight. 
The final expression of Roman usury law was the Code of Justinian (533 A.D.) 
issued from Constantinople after the fall of the Roman Empire in the West.99 It set a 
graduated scale of maximum rates ranging from 8%on loans made by banks, to 6% on 
loans made by ordinary citizens, to 12% on maritime loans. 100 This scheme represented a 
considerable advance in the economic sophistication of the law, for it recognized the 
fundamental difference between commercial and consumer loans, at least to the extent of 
permitting banks to lend at higher rates than ordinary citizens, who would presumably 
make mainly personalloans. 101 
The Code also made explicit allowance for risk, another element that is ignored 
by any unified rate ceiling. 102 In any era or commercial setting, a few loans will 
inevitably prove to be uncollectable. This is a normal expense of the lender's business; it 
must be considered in computing his overall profit. 103 If Roman lenders were to be 
97 HOMER AND SYLLA, supra note II, at 4 7 (4th ed. 2005); 
98 !d. 
99 ACKERMAN, supra note I, at 71. 
100 !d. 
101 HOMER AND SYLLA, supra note II, at 44 (4th ed. 2005); ACKERMAN, supra note I, at 
70. 
102 ACKERMAN, supra note I, at 71. 
103 ACKERMAN, supra note I, at 71 (1981) (Part of the charge made on each collectable 
loan goes merely to compensate for lost principal. If a $100 loan had a I %chance of loss, 
then about $1 of the interest charge must be allotted to cover this risk. When $100 is 
uncollectable by debtor default, the loss is balanced by the risk -charge of the many loans 
that are repaid. As the risk increases, an increasingly greater portion of the loan-charge 
motivated to make more hazardous loans, the rate limit had to be correspondingly 
higher. 104 As long as the rewards for success remained high, as in sea-trade, then the 
merchant whose ship came in would be able to profit despite a high interest rate; the 
lender could receive a fair return and also be covered for his risk ofloss. 105 
As trade develops in any given society, merchants begin to seek loans to finance 
their ventures. 106 These new borrowers differ substantially from consumers. For the 
commercial borrower, repayment is not so arduous a task. He does not consume the loan, 
but invests it to produce gain. 107 Since the principal retains value in the form of 
merchandise or capital goods, the debtor need earn only enough to pay the interest. From 
expected profits, he has a natural source for repayment. 108 In addition, the commercial 
borrower occupies a better bargaining position than the consumer. 109 His needs are not so 
desperate; if the rate is too high, he can choose not to borrow. 11° For these reasons, the 
commercial borrower does not seem to need the same kind of protection as the consumer. 
The benefits of trade are quickly apparent: it provides revenue for the state and 
profitable investments for the influential classes. These advantages create a strong 
incentive for permitting the interest charges that stimulate commercial activity. Attitudes 
in commercially active societies reflect these factors. 
must be used merely to restore losses. Thus, any single rate ceiling penalizes risky 
loans.). 
104 Id. 
105 ACKERMAN, supra note I, at 71 (1981) 
106 Id. at 65. 
101 Id. 
108 ld. 
109 ld. 
110 ld. 
II. The Scholastic Theory of Usury: the Fourth to the Sixteenth Century 
With the context of the varying alternatives to regulating credit proposed by the 
ancient world established, this Part traces the history of the scholastic theory of usury 
from its beginnings in ancient biblical texts through its developments in the Middle Ages. 
The scholastic thinkers translated the simple biblical prohibitions into the language of the 
Roman law and natural law philosophy. Part A summarizes the ancient foundation on 
which the scholastics worked. Part 8 analyzes the scholastics' philosophical, juridical 
and theological defenses of these foundations. Part C presents the scholastics' 
application of the scholastic theory to actual economic situations. 
A. Ancient Foundations: Biblical Text and Roman Law and Aristotelian Philosophy 
The scholastic theory established principles for identifying transactions that 
constituted usury. 111 It then prohibited them on terms originating in the ancient Jewish 
approach. 112 The Jewish scriptures contained several texts concerning usury that became 
the starting point of analysis for the scholastics: 
"If thou lend money to any of my people that is poor that dwelleth with thee: thou 
shalt not be hard upon them as an extortioner, nor oppress them with usuries." 113 
111 MCCALL, supra note I 0, at 558. 
I 12 ld. 
113 Exoous 22:25 (King James Version) 
"If thy brother be impoverished, and weak of hand, and thou receive him as a 
stranger and sojourner, and he live with thee, take not usury of him nor more than thou 
gavest: fear thy God, that thy brother may live with thee." 114 
Interest was entirely forbidden on loans to others within the community. These 
commands contemplate "consumer" loans to meet immediate wants. 115 To exact interest 
from the needy is extortion. 116 Among tribal "brothers" mercy and charity are the ideal.117 
Foreigners did not receive this protection. Deuteronomy 23:20-21 provides: "To a 
foreigner you may lend upon interest, but to your brother you shall not. .. "118 In charging 
interest to foreigners, the Hebrews were only following local custom. 119 The special 
solicitude for tribal brothers did not extend to foreign idolators. 120 As long as charity 
prevailed among Hebrews, the law was satisfied. 121 
The early Christian church also vigorously condemned usury. 122 Nevertheless, the 
New Testament was equivocal on interest. It required charity toward the poor: "Give to 
him who begs from you, and do not refuse him who would borrow from you,'ol 23 and "if 
you lend to those from whom you hope to receive, what credit is that to you? For even 
sinners lend to sinners, to receive as much again .... Lend, expecting nothing in 
114 LEVITICUS 25:35-37 (King James Version) 
115 AcKERMAN, supra note I, at 64. 
116 !d. 
117 !d. 
118 DEUTERONOMY 23:20-21 (KING JAMES VERSION). 
119 ACKERMAN, supra note 1, at64(1981) 
120 Id. 
121 Id. 
122 Matthew 5:42 (Revised Standard Version). 
123 LUKE 6:33-35 (REVISED STANDARD VERSION). 
retum." 124 Yet, in parable, the "slothful servant" is chastised for permitting his master's 
money to lie idle, rather than putting it out at interest to produce gain. 125 The early church 
fathers condemned interest taking as a sin against Christian charity. The Old Testament 
prohibitions, however, remained solid scriptural foundations for condemning usury. 126 
These biblical texts and references provided the underlying principles of usury 
analysis in the West for approximately 1,200 years. 127 The Church greatly influenced the 
emerging legal order, directly through canon law and ecclesiastical courts, and indirectly 
through canon law's impact on secular legal regimes and theologically-informed legal 
teaching at Church-dominated universities. 128 The Church's influence would be of purely 
historical interest were it exclusively procedural in character. Not surprisingly, however, 
the emerging law had a powerful normative basis, a moral framework that in many 
. . . d d h h f 129 sttuatwns tmpe e t e growt o commerce. 
In the medieval period, to be European was nearly synonymous with being a 
Christian. 130 The Church "wielded a real authority over the faithful," and the pope, as the 
head of its hierarchy, was charged with no less a duty than "to lead men to eternal 
124 LUKE 19:23, MATTHEW 25:27. 
125 ACKERMAN, supra note 1, at 72. 
126 See notes 113-119 supra and accompanying text. 
127 BRIAN M. MCCALL, LEARNING FROM OUR HISTORY: EVALUATING THE MODERN HOUSING 
FINANCE MARKH IN LIGHT OF ANCIENT PRINCIPLES OF JUSTICE, 60 S.C. L. REV. 707, 711 
(2009). 
128 DENNIS J. CALLAHAN, MEDIEVAL CHURCll NORMS AND FIDUCIARY DUTIES IN 
PARTNERSHIP, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 215,224-26 (2004). 
129 ld. 
130 DAVID J. GERBER, PROMETHEUS BORN: THE HIGH MIDDLE AGES AND THE RELATIONSHIP 
BETWEEN LAW AND ECONOMIC CONDUCT, 38 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 673,683 (1994) ("Europe 
during this period was a Christian civilization, organized and dominated by Christian 
symbols, ideas and institutions."). Ecclesiastical courts even had jurisdiction over Jews in 
cases brought against Christians, or where the "secular authorities did not offer adequate 
protection to them." HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION: THE FORMATION OF THE 
WESTERN UGAI. TRADITION 222 ( 1983 ). 
life." 131 Throughout the period "the canonists were constantly endeavoring to make their 
system correspond as closely as possible with the ideal of Christian conduct, and to 
reduce to a minimum the divergence between law and morals."132 Moral norms were 
reinforced both publicly, through canon law enforced in ecclesiastical courts, and 
privately, in the confessional, creating a mutually reinforcing system of norm 
standardization and enforcement. 133 
Grounded in community values, Church norms were often inimical to commerce 
and wealth creation. 134 Viewed as pitting believers against each other, mercantile profit 
endangered the Church's conception of society as a communal endeavor, and was closely 
circumscribed. 135 In the canonists' zero-sum view of the nascent marketplace, 
"commercial activity [was] incompatible with religious salvation," so the emerging 
131 THEODORE F. T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 278-79 (2D 
ED. 1936) (examining how customary law spread through its application in mercantile 
courts at fairs and eventually entered the common law); WILLIAM F. WALSH, OUTLINES 
OF THE HISTORY OF AMERICAN AND ENGLISH LAW 81 (1924); (declaring that "customary 
law must be regarded as the common law in the making, ready to be put in final form as a 
coordinated, rationalized system of national law"); see WILLIAM W. BASSETT, CANON 
LAW AND THE COMMON LAW, 29 HASTINGS L. J. 1383, 1418 (1978) ("No matter what be 
our religious beliefs, since the canonists struck the spark to push back the night of the 
dark ages, we have believed and continued to hold firm the conviction, against waves of 
discouragement from almost overwhelming odds, that law is good and that good laws and 
rood lawyers can make people whole and set them free."). 
32 DENNIS J. CALLAHAN, MEDIEVAL CHURCH NORMS AND FIDUCIARY DUTIES IN 
P ART:VERSHIP, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 215, 224-26 (2004); PLUCKNETT, supra note 131, at 
269; see BASSETT, supra note 131, at 1387 ("The canon law carried a detailed ideal of 
life and practical adjudication of life's affairs, deliberately intended to be an example to 
secular jurists, both to civilists of the Roman-law tradition and the common-law 
practitioners, of how law should relate to justice from the ideal vantage point of a 
Christian perspective."). 
133 !d. at 226. 
134 Patrick Cleary, The Church and Usury: An Essay on Some Historical and Theological 
Aspects of Money Lending 82 (1972) 
135 ld. 
merchant class was seen as especially vulnerable to market temptations. 136 While profits 
taken from agricultural or textile production were viewed positively, the Church 
"regarded as suspect profits of speculation, banking, and finance." 137 Moreover, the 
Church declared the principles of supply and demand unjust. Instead of allowing market 
forces to drive wages and prices, the Church created a regulatory regime which fixed 
standards of value. 138 
By linking commercial activity to temptation, and by framing mercantile profit 
making and financing activity as contrary to communal values, the Church was able to 
establish pervasive control over economic matters. 139 For instance, the Church 
adjudicated contract disputes, exerting jurisdiction over oath-based promises, and in the 
process shaped the long-established values of the Christian community into a "good faith 
contracting" norm which displaced the formalism of the Roman Iaw. 140 Similarly, the 
Church injected its notions of fairness and justice into the marketplace by reawakening 
136 DAVID J. GERBER, PROMETHEUS BORN: TH£ HIGH MIDDLEAG£S AND TilE RELATIONSHIP 
BETWEEN LAW AND ECONOMIC CONDUCT, 38 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 673, 697 (1994); see ld. at 
696 ("The church's dominant role in society meant that its values would be the starting-
point for responding to the market, and the church's tradition was filled with antipathy to 
commerce."). 
137 Patrick Cleary, The Church and Usury: An Essay on Some Historical and Theological 
Aspects of Money Lending 82 (1972) 
138 PLUCKNETT, supra note 131, at 270 
139 JAMES A. BRUNDAGE, MEDIEVAL CANON LAW 175 (1995) ("Canonical 
rules ... reached .. .into virtually every nook and cranny of human conduct, both public and 
private."); TODD J. ZYWICKI, THE RISE AND FAU. OF EFFICIENCY IN THE COMMON LAW: A 
SUPPLY SiDE ANALYSIS, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 1551,1591 ("The assertion of authority over all 
'spiritual matters' meant in practice that the church was able to create a sort of 'shadow 
claim' for almost every claim recognized in other legal jurisdictions, rrom contract, to 
debt, to criminal law, to testamentary succession."); 
140 DENNIS J. CALLAHAN, MEDIEVAL CHURC/J NORMS AND FIDUCIARY DUTIES IN 
PARTNERSHIP, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 215,224-26 (2004). 
the "just price" theory of the Justinian Code, thereby encouraging "the regulation of 
prices ... on the grounds that it protected the common welfare."141 
Similar to the Christian principles endorsed by the Church during this time, Islam 
also governs life based on moral obedience and compliance. However, Muslim 
compliance is based upon the the Qur'an, as well as the words and actions of the Prophet 
Muhammad, known as the Sunnah. 142 Through centuries of careful interpretation and 
exegesis, the scholarly tradition oflslam has derived legal principles from these primary 
sources 
143 to create a body of law known as the Shari'ah, which literally means "The 
Way." 144 Since the vast majority of Muslims are not scholars, the Shari'ah represents a 
vital connection to authentic sources of Muslim faith and practice. 145 The scholars who 
141 GERBER, supra note 130, at 699, 714-20; see BERMAN, supra note 130, at 21 
(commenting that the Church promoted a "realization ofjustice ... proclaimed as a 
messianic ideal of the law itself," associated in the Middle Ages "with the Last Judgment 
and the Kingdom of God" and later "with public spirit, fairness, and the traditions of the 
past"); BASSETT, supra note 131, at 1417-18 (noting that ecclesiastic chancellors and 
canon lawyers developed the "notions of good faith, fairness, [and] balancing of 
hardships"). 
142 SULMAN A. BHATTI, THE SHARI'AH AND THE CHALLENGE AND OPPORTUNITY OF 
EMBRACING FINANCE "WITHOUT INTEREST", 2010 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 205,208 (2010); 
F ARAZ FA REED RABBANI, THE ABSOLU1E ESSENTIALS OF ISLAM 9 (2005). 
143 BHATTI, supra note 137, at 208 (The primary sources oflslamic Law are, in order of 
authority, from greatest to least: the Qur'an, the Sunnah, ijma (consensus of the scholars), 
and qiyas (analogical reasoning). The Qur'an is believed to be the literal word of God 
conveyed to the Prophet Muhammad. CHRIS ROEDERER & DARREL MOELLENDORF, 
JURISPRUDENCE 465-66 (2004)). 
144 Id. (The development of the Shari'ah is akin in both purpose and method to the 
codification of the Civil Law in modern European countries. The aim was to compile the 
principles oflslam from the authentic sources of the religion, which were the Qur'an and 
the Sunnah. In the European case, these authentic sources were either the Roman 
commentaries of Justinian, or the natural law tradition. See, e.g., RENE DAVID & JOHN 
E. C. BRIERLEY, MAJOR LEGAL SYSTEMS IN THE WORLD TODAY22-27 (3D ED. 1985). 
145 BHATTI, supra note 137, at 208. 
exposit the Shari'ah are individuals who have, inter alia, years of formal legal training in 
the science of "jiqh," or the fundamental principles of Islamic jurisprudence. 146 
Using well-settled methods of derivation, 147 these scholar-jurists have steadily 
developed a corpus oflegal opinions that is intended to meet the unique needs of 
Muslims in various times and places.148 Muslims are free to consult jurists sua sponte and 
examine various legal opinions on a given issue that concerns them. 149 Indeed, with the 
exception of the immutable principles contained within the Qur'an, a Muslim is never 
bound to accept any legal opinion or new juristic rule that he or she does not agree 
with. 150 By the same token, since the tradition is self-referencing and cumulative, a 
consensus by a majority of jurists on an issue constitutes a type oflegal proof in and of 
itself, which can carry a significant amount of spiritual weight. 151 Hence, to the extent 
that the Shari'ah can be followed, 152 observing it is just one step in the process ofliving a 
"god conscious" life, 153 or in a manner that is consistent with the Qur'an and the Sunnah. 
One of the central features of Islamic transactional law is that it completely 
prohibits interest, or "riba. " 154 Several verses in the Qur'an denounce interest as 
146 Id. at 208. This is the foundation of Islamic jurisprudence. (See W AEL B. HALLAQ, A 
HISTORY OF ISLAMIC LEGAL THEORIES: AN INTRODUCTION TO SUNNI USUL AL-F!QH I 
(1999).) 
147 Based on its reliance on precedent and analogy, some have noted that Islamic 
jurisprudence is a common law tradition. Id. at 208-209. 
148 HESHAM M. SHARA WY, UNDERSTANDING THE ISLAMIC PROHIBITION OF biTEREST: A 
GUIDE TO AID ECONOMIC COOPERATION BETWEEN THE IS!.AM!C AND WESTERN WORLDS, 29 
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 153, 158 (2000). 
149 BHATTI, supra note 137, at 208. 
150 Id. at 209 
Is! Id. 
152 BHA TTl, supra note 137, at 209. 
153 BHATTI, supra note 137, at209-210. 
154 BHATTI, supra note 137, at 211. Although the term riba is used in the Qur'an, it is 
never precisely defined in relation to finance. The word riba is derived from the Arabic 
contravening God's design for humanity: "Those who devour interest (riba) will rise up 
on the day of Resurrection as those tormented by Satan's touch. That is because they say 
that 'Trade and usury' are the same. However, God permits trade, and prohibits usury ... 
. "
155 Elsewhere, the Qur'an states: "God condemns usury (riba), and blesses charities ... 0 
you who believe, be mindful of God and refrain from all kinds of interest, if you are truly 
believers ... "156 Apart from economic reasons, Islam also prohibits the charging of 
interest out of a concern for social justice. One of the five pillars of the Islamic faith 
is the annual payment of a certain percentage of one's disposable income as 
"zakaat" or "alms for the poor."157 Even beyond zakaat, individuals are commanded 
to give charitably at regular intervals to over five distinct classes of individuals 
verb raba, which literally means to "exceed" or "increase," and all scholars agree that it 
covers both interest and usury. Hence, the one-to-one relationship between riba and 
interest alone is slightly misleading. For an extended analysis of the term and the 
scholarly debate surrounding its definition (the analysis of which is beyond the scope of 
this Note) seeM. KABIR HASSAN & MERVYN K. LEWIS, HANDBOOK OF ISLAMIC BANKING 
43 (EDWARD ELGAR PUBLISHING 2007). Nevertheless, many have attempted to cabin the 
meaning ofriba to mean engaging in the charging of"exploitative interest" only. See 
ARIEL BERSCHADSKY, L'INOVA71VE FiNANCIAL SECURITIES IN THE MIDDLE EAST: 
SUR1wOUNTING THE BAN ON INTEREST IN ISLAMIC LAW, 9 U. MIAMI Bus. 1. REV. 107, !08 
(2001). However, the definition of the term that will be used by this Note, which 
represents the consensus of the commercial sector and numerous scholars, is that riba 
refers to the payment/collection of any type of interest per se, whether fixed or floating, 
simple or compound, excessive or nominal. 
155 Id. M.A.S. ABDEL HALEEM, THE QUR'AN 2:275 (OXFORD UNIV. PRESS 2008) 
[hereinafter Qur'an ]. 
56 Id. at 2: 276-280. Compound interest is, perforce, forbidden: "0 you who believe, you 
shall not take interest (riba), compounded over and over. Be aware of God, so that you 
may prosper." Id. at 3:130. 
157 Linguistically, zalma! has two meanings: "purification" and "growth." In essence, 
paying zalma! means to purify one's wealth by distributing a prescribed amount to those 
in need. For a detailed treatment of this concept in Islam, see Mamoun Sakkal, The Zakat 
Handbook: A Practical Guide for Muslims in the West (2008). 
within society including relatives, beggars, orphans, and the destitute.158 In light of 
these positive duties to actively disseminate wealth throughout society, prohibiting 
interest preempts its use as an exploitative and oppressive tool throughout the 
course of executing one's moral and social obligations.159 Hence, Islam's 
preoccupation with interest ultimately reflects both *217 economic and social 
concerns, 160 and careful observance of the prohibition is an essential part of Muslim 
spiritual and economic life. 
Solman A. Bhatti, The Shari'ah and the Challenge and Opportunity of Embracing 
Finance "Without Interest", 2010 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 205,216-17 (2010) 
B. Scholastics' Philosophical, Juridical And Theological Defenses Of These 
Foundations. 
The scholastics developed a definition of usury in light of two sources from the 
ancient world: Roman Law and Aristotelian philosophy. An early scholastic analysis of 
usury rested on the legal definition in Roman law of a loan, mutuum. 161 In a loan, it was 
158 See Qur'an, 2:177 ("The truly good are those who believe in God and the Last Day, in 
the angels, the Scripture, and the prophets; who give away some of their wealth, however 
much they cherish it, to their relatives, to orphans, the needy, travelers and beggars, and 
liberate those in bondage.") 
159 See Qur'an, 4:161 ("They took riba, though they were forbidden and that they 
devoured men's substance wrongfully- We have prepared for them a grievous 
punishment."); see also Qur'an, 2:280 ("If a debtor is unable to pay, than wait for a better 
time [before collecting]. [However] if you give up the loan as a charity, it would be better 
for you, if you only knew.") 
160 See CH!AN WU, iSLAMiC BANKING: SiGNS Of" SUSTAINABLE GROW7H, 16 MINN. J. lNT'L L. 
233, 236-7 (2007). 
161 NOONAN, supra note 82, at215-17. 
argued, mine (meum) becomes yours (tuum). 162 This etymology reflected the legal 
classification. 163 Roman law played two key roles in the development of usury doctrine. 
The first was as a source of conceptual structure. 164 Roman Jaw did not recognize the 
concept of contract in the abstract; it treated only specific types of contract, each of which 
was subject to its own rules. 165 One of these contract types was the "mutuum," in which 
one party transferred property to another in exchange for a promise to return the same 
property or its equivalent. 166 The canonists seized upon the mutuum concept, added a 
normative element, and used it in defining usury. 167 Previous tradition had defined usury 
as '"to demand more than one gives."168 The canonists recast usury as profit on a mutuum 
contract, thus making the mutuum concept an important doctrinal anchor for the usury 
norm.169 
Roman Jaw also provided a solution to the usury problem that was resisted at first, 
but later adopted. Roman law did not prohibit loans at interest, but it did proscribe 
interest in excess of rates fixed by the authorities (usually ten percent). 170 Initially, 
Romanists and canonists thus had to explain why Roman law's apparent acceptance of 
(moderate) interest should be disregarded. 171 They avoided this obstacle by explaining 
that on this point Roman law was not authoritative, because Justinian's compilation 
162 !d. 
163 !d. 
164 DA V1D J. GERBER, PROMETHEUS BORN: THE HIGH MIDDLE AGES AND THE RELATlONSflfP 
BETWEEN LAW AND ECONOMIC CONDUCT, 38 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 673,709 (1994). 
165 !d. 
166 !d. 
167 DENNIS J. CALLAHAN, MEDIEVAL CllURCH NORMS AND FIDUCIARY DUTIES IN 
PARTNERSHIP, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 215,227 (2004). 
168 NoONAN, supra note 12, at I 00-0 I. 
169 Id. 
170 HOMER AND SYLLA, supra note II, at 71. 
171 ACKERMAN, supra note I, at 74. 
explicitly incorporated changes made by the church. 172 Nevertheless, the idea that the 
better solution might be merely to restrict interest rates was continually present, and it 
was eventually readopted. 173 
As defined by Roman law a mutuum was the transfer of ownership. If what was 
mine was now yours, it would be a contradiction in terms to charge for its use. 174 Put in 
Roman law terms, one cannot enter into both a transfer of ownership (such as a mutuum) 
and a contract for use (such as a locatio conductio rei) for money. 175 By entering into a 
mutuum, the attribute of use has vested in the recipient with the mutuum. 176 Return of the 
good was, of course, stipulated for by the contract, but there was an inherent 
contradiction in temporarily transferring ownership and also requiring payment for the 
use of the good during the time it was loaned. 177 The legal classification of the loan was 
itself violated by making the gratuitous act productive of gain. 178 
In this argument, "nature" seemed to be nothing other than the order established 
by law. 179 According to this "natural law" theory of usury, someone who lends money for 
the purpose of consumption, as opposed to investment in a business venture, should be 
entitled merely to compensation for loss incurred in making the loan ("interest" in the 
172 DAVID J. GERBER, PROMETHEUS BORX: TH£ HIGH MIDDLE AGES AND 7HE RELATIONSHIP 
BETWEEN LAW AND ECONOMIC CONDUCT, 38 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 673,709 (1994). 
173 NOONAN, supra note 82, at 215-16. 
174 DIGEST A 50.16.121, IN CORPUS JURIS CIVILIS. 
175 McCALL, supra note I 0, at 566. 
176 Id. 
177 NooNAN, supra note 82, at 215-16. 
178 See HOMER & SYLLA, supra note II, at 71. ("The prohibition was against usury, 
'where more is asked than is given.' The Latin noun usura means the 'use' of anything, in 
this case the use of borrowed capital; hence, usury was the price paid for the use of 
money. The Latin verb intereo means 'to be lost'; a substantive form interisse [sic] 
developed into the modem term 'interest.' Interest was not profit but loss.") 
179 NOONAN, supra note 82, at 216. 
original Roman law meaning of the word). 180 It was not made clear why another contract 
to pay usury could not be added to the gratuitous loan contract, especially as the Roman 
law itself recognized this possibility. 181 It was not apparent why, for a man entering into 
the loan relationship, the legal description of the loan contract was decisive. 182 The 
argument based on the nature of the mutuum gradually became obsolete. The charging of 
"usury" in the scholastic sense (and used in this Article as distinguished from modem 
usury statutes) is the exaction of the payment of a gain above compensation for loss. 183 
The charging of usury is impermissible. 184 
A more substantial argument was based on the nature of money. Its classic 
formulation was by Aristotle. 185 Money, he said, was invented to facilitate exchange, as 
the exchange of real goods was too awkward for civic life. 186 To use money in 
a loan to gain more money was to misuse money, "for money was intended to be used in 
exchange, not to increase at usury. 187 Aristotle believed that interest was inherently 
180 NOONAN, supra note 12, at I 05-06. 
181 The Corpus Juris consisted of four parts: The codex, primarily a collection of edicts of 
Roman emperors; the digest, a compilation of opinions of jurisconsults from the classical 
period; the institutes, a basic introduction to Roman law; and the novels, selections from 
Justinian's own legislation. For a discussion of the roles played by the various materials 
in legal education during the medieval period, See ALAN WATSON, THE MAKING OF 
THECIVILLAW!0-!3 (1981). 
182 McCALL, supra note 10, at 549. 
183 POPE BENEDICT XIV, VIX PER VENIT, P3.1-11 (Nov.!, !745), available at 
http://www.ewtn.com/library/ENCYC/B 14VIXPE.htm ("The nature of... usury has its 
proper place and origin in a loan contract. This financial contract between consenting 
parties demands, by its very nature, that one return to another only as much as he has 
received .... [A]ny gain which exceeds the amount [the lender] gave is illicit and 
usurious."). 
184 McCALL, supra note I 0, at 567. 
185 !d. 
186 !d. 
187 ARISTOTLE, POLITICS !256-!258b, tr. B. JOWETT, in !0 WORKS. 
unnatural and unjust. 188 This conclusion was based upon Aristotle's analysis of 
economics. He stated that the goal of economic activity was to satisfy physical 
requirements such as food and clothing. 189 The production of goods to fill these needs is 
the commendable, "natural" form of money- making. 19° Farming, stock raising, and 
manufacturing fall into this category. 191 They produce their own "increase" in a natural 
and beneficial way. 192 Money functions properly as a medium of exchange to facilitate 
the transfer of goods. 193 The argument here was still legal, but in its focus on the purpose 
of money it looked beyond the Jaw to the human purpose in inventing money .194 It did 
not indicate, however, how this human purpose was frustrated if money were used both in 
commerce and in interest -bearing loans. 195 It seemed to assume that, once the purpose of 
money was fixed by man, it was immoral to find some other purpose. 196 
Associated with this analysis of the purpose of money was a contrast between 
money and naturally fruitful goods. The Greek word itself for usury, tokos. meant 
"offspring.'"97 Usury, Aristotle said, was offspring "against nature," and the nature 
Aristotle appealed to was the nature of the universe. He compared this offspring of sterile 
coin with the fruit of plants and the offspring of animals: these were "in accordance with 
nature." All mercantile trade was "against nature." But usury was most against nature, for 
188 ACKERMAN, supra note I, at 69. 
189 Id. 
190 DAVID J. GERBER, PROMETHEUS BORN: THE HIGH MIDDLE AGES AND THE RELATIONSHIP 
BETWEEN LAW AND ECONOMIC CONDUCT, 38 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 673,708 (1994). 
191 ACKERMAN, supra note 1, at 70. 
192 McCALL, supra note 10, at 566. 
193 See ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS V, IN THE BASIC WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 927-
1002 (RICHARD McKEON ED., 1941 ). 
194 NooNAN, supra note 82, at 216 (1965). 
195 Id. 
196 Id. 
197 NOONAN, supra note 82, at 216 (1965). 
here sterile coin itself bore fruit. 198 Thus, money was considered "sterile," since it did not 
increase or diminish over time. 199 From this perspective, the usury prohibition was 
absolute and included any profit on a loan.200 This Aristotelian analysis was a favorite of 
Christian theologians.201 God the creator had given fertility only to sexually differentiated 
animals.202 Among the medieval theologians the sterility of money was a commonplace, 
and the conclusion was regularly drawn that from a naturally sterile good no increase 
should be taken?03 
Reflecting this sterility of money theory, the canon law promoted the belief that 
only charitable loans were acceptable.204 The linking of charity to loans answered the 
Church's communal "precept of helping one's neighbor in necessity" because the need for 
a loan would most often arise when the borrower had suffered some misfortune, 205 and 
would therefore be in a weak bargaining position?06 "In such situations the cohesiveness 
of the community required that others make the needed loan without asking for the 
payment of interest."207 Because a lender could not receive title to repayment beyond the 
principal, any interest-bearing loan was considered usurious.208 
198 Id. 
199 DENNIS J. CALLAHAN, MEDIEVAL CHURCII NORA1S AND FIDUCIARY DUTIES IN 
PARTNERSHIP, 26 CARDOZO L. REv. 215,227-28 (2004). 
200 Id. 
201 NooNAN, supra note 82, at 216 (1965). 
202 Id. 
203 ACKERMAN, supra note ] , at 74-75. 
204 Id. 
205 NOONAN, supra note 12, at 42. 
206 DAVID J. GERBER, PROMETHEUS BORN: THE HIGH MIDDLE AGES AND THE RELATIONSHIP 
B£TWI:EN LAW ANDECO:VOMIC CONDUCT, 38 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 673,705 (1994). 
201 Id. 
208 DENNIS J. CALLAHAN, M£DIEVAL CHURCII NOR,VS AND FIDUCIARY DUTIES IN 
PAR7NI·:RSIIIP, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 215,227-28 (2004). 
St. Thomas Aquinas attempted a subtle reformation of the sterility of money 
theory, and in turn, produced the most influential analysis of the interest question.209 His 
condemnation of interest, a reformulation of Aristotle's idea of the "sterility" of money," 
became the basis for later Catholic doctrine.210 Aquinas divided goods into two classes: 
"fungible" and "non-fungible."211 With non-fungible goods, the use of the loan can be 
separated from the thing itself.212 A house or farm, for example, are not essentially 
consumed in their use. They may deteriorate over a period, but to use them is not 
necessarily to consume them.213 Thus, the use of a farm could be lent, the profits taken, 
and the farm returned undiminished.214 Since the use was separable from the farm, a 
h fi h. . 'fi d 215 c arge or t IS use was JUSt! 1e . 
Fungible goods, on the other hand, were products such as wine or grain in which 
the intended use consumed the product.216 For these goods the value of their use and the 
value of their substance are identical.217 In contrast to a non-fungible good such as a 
farm, it is essential to the nature of drinking wine that the wine be consumed.218 For 
goods consumed in their use it is wrong to charge for the use, for the use is identical with 
the substance.219 To sell wine, and then to sell its use, is to sell the same thing twice.220 
209 
210 
211 ACKERMAN, supra note I, at 74-75. 
212 !d. 
213 NOONAN, supra note 82, at 216-217 (1965). 
214 !d. 
215 ACKERMAN, supra note I, at 74-75. 
216 !d. 
211 Id. 
218 NoONAN, supra note 82, at 216-217 (1965). 
219 Id. 
220 ACKERMAN, supra note I, at 75. 
Similarly, to lend money and get it back with a payment for its use is to be given back 
h h . 221 more t an you ave g1ven. 
The influence of Aquinas's thought was widespread. For example, the Fifth 
Lateran Council in 1515 defined usury as "gain sought from the use of a thing not fruitful 
in itself(as a flock or a field), without labor, expense or risk on the part of the lender."222 
Preceding the Fifth Lateran Council, however, the Church issued similar decrees 
at the Second, Third, and Fourth Lateran Councils (1139, 1179, and 1215)223 which 
proscribed excommunication for usurers, refused usurers burial in Christian grounds, and 
interdicted usurers' offerings.224 In 1234, Pope Gregory IX (1227-1241) issued his 
Deere tales, which forever classed usurers as infames (making them ineligible to hold 
public office, honors, or to testify in court), commanded princes to expel usurers from 
their realms, forbade landlords from renting property to usurers, and invalidated the wills 
and testaments ofusurers.225 Throughout the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, the 
221 ld. 
222 See also JACQUES LE GOFF, LICIT AND ILLICIT TRADES IN THE MEDIEVAL WEST, IN 
JACQUES LE GOFI·; TIME, WORK AND CULTURE IN THE MIDDLE AGES 58, 64-66 (ARTHUR 
GOLDHAMMER TRANS., 1980). 
223 ld. 
224 STEVEN M. GRA YES & CHRISTOPHER L. PETERSON, USURY LAW AND THE CHRISTIAH 
RIGHT: FAITH-BASED POLITICAL POWER AND THE GEOGRAPHY OF AMERICAN PAYDAY LOAN 
REGULATION, 57 CATH. U. L. REV. 637,652 (2008). 
225 GREGORY IX, NAVIGANTI: DU.'RETALES, V:J9:6 (1234), REPRINTED IN 4 READINGS IN 
WESTERN CIVIL!ZATIOV: MEDIEVAL EUROPE 316 (JULIUS KIRSHNER AND KARL F. 
MORRISON, EDS., JULIUS KiRSHNER, TRANS., 1986). GRATIAN, DECRETUM, IN 1 CORPUS 
!URIS CANONIC! (E. FRIEDBERG ED. 1879, Ri:PRINTED 1959). For a discussion of the 
Decretum and its influence, see STANLEY CHODOROW, CHRISTIAN POUT/CAL THEORY AND 
CHURCH POLITICS IN THE MID-TWELFTH CENTURYYYYYYY(I972) and STEPHAN KUTTNER, 
GRATH\' AND THE SCHOOLS 0FLAW(I983). 
Church's "campaign against usury" crystallized into a staunch prohibition in any form, 
and the moneylender was linked with the worst type of evildoers.226 
The proposition that interest on money loans was inherently immoral created a 
serious roadblock to further economic expansion.227 Unlike the Roman usury laws, which 
were widely ignored when inconvenient, medieval religious sanctions were taken very 
seriously by merchants. 228 It was a time of faith; sin was feared, and excommunication 
dreaded. 229 The problem was not how to evade legal restrictions, but how to trade without 
sinning.230 The prohibition against usury was, at least in theory, an absolute one: any 
return beyond the principal was prohibited, but it applied only to loan contracts.231 This 
opened up the possibility of evading the prohibition by disguising loans through the use 
of more complicated contracts.232 To provide spiritually acceptable commercial capital, 
investment schemes were developed which provided for a rate of return without formally 
relying on a loan or interest charge. 233 
C. Application of The Scholastic Theory to Actual Economic Situations. 
226 ACKERMAN, supra note I, at 74-75. 
227 For a discussion of the moral context in which these values were shaped, see WAYNE 
A. MEEKS, THE MORAL WORLD OF THE FIRST CHRISTIANS (1986) and ROBIN L. FOX, 
PAGANS AND CHRISTIANS 265-608 (1986). 
228 PAUL B. RASOR, BIBLICAL ROOTS OF MODER.'! CONSU.'.1ER CREDIT LAW, 10 J.L. & 
RELIGION 157, 171 (1994). 
229 ld. 
230 Jd. 
231 For discussion of the church's accommodation of commercial objectives, see HAROLD 
J. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION: THE FORMATIO.V OF THE WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION 
336-39 (1983). 
232 RAsoR, supra note 223, at 171. 
233 Jd. 
EVASIVE TACTICS -EMERGENCE OF TWO FINANCIAL SYSTEMS -INTEREST 
V. NO-INTEREST 
Contractum Trinius, or the "triple contract",234 was a form of partnership 
developed as a common means of avoidance. Its aim was to bypass the canon law ban of 
usury, a law the Church aggressively tried to uphold.235 The lender was designated as the 
investing partner in a venture.Z36 The active partner, in separate contracts, guaranteed full 
repayment of the investment even if the venture failed and stipulated a fixed share of 
profits for the investor.237 Together, the three contracts essentially created a loan at 
interest, but since profits from actual trade were permissible, the transaction was not 
considered usurious. 238 It was an amalgamation of three separate contracts, each 
individually acceptable to the Church, but which together generated a fixed rate of return, 
i.e., an interest-bearing loan in all but name.239 The fast spreading and widespread 
practice ofContractum Trinius (i.e., usury) by European merchants in the Middle Ages 
began to place undue pressure on the Catholic Church's doctrine which banned such 
money practices.Z40 Eventually, the Church yielded to this commercial pressure.241 
234 MCCALL, supra note I 0, at 583-85. 
235 Canon law is the ecclesiastical law of the Roman Catholic Church. It is complete legal 
system which encompasses courts, lawyers, judges, a fully articulated legal code and 
principles oflegal interpretation. See Canon Law, Catholic Encyclopedia, 
http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/09056a.htm. 
236 Although those holding the triple contract not a usurious loan in substance prevailed in 
establishing a consensus, there were those who argued even into the eighteenth century 
that the form of a societas was so altered that in substance the triple contract was a loan 
and thus profit usurious. See NOONAN, supra note 12, at 225-28. 
237 Id. 
238 ld. 
239 ACKERMAN, supra note I, at 76. 
240 Id. See McCALL, supra note I 0, at 583-85. 
241 Id. 
Another very common form of investment was the sale of "annuities," also called 
"rentes" or "census.242 The seller received a sum of cash, and in exchange the purchaser 
received the profits from a designated piece of productive land (usually a farm) for a 
period oftime.243 Frequently, the annuity was to last for the purchaser's life.244 Originally, 
the profits were actually collected in produce.245 Later, annual payments of money were 
fixed?46 The annuity was an important means of support for widows and disabled 
people.247 Sellers were frequently governments or landed nobles who needed to raise 
. k h 248 qmc cas . 
Merchants could also use "bills of exchange" to produce the effect of interest. 249 
The bill of exchange was essentially a personal check used to make purchases in foreign 
trade. 250 The seller who took the bill was extending credit for the time (usually months) 
required to send the bill back to its source for redemption.251 Normally, the transaction 
involved conversion of one form of currency to another.252 By setting an artificially high 
rate of currency exchange, the seller could receive a profit on his extension of credit.253 
242 ACKERMAN, supra note I, at 76. 
243 Id. 
244 For example, many scholastics considered a personal census (one whose base was all 
the assets of the seller including his future income from wage labor) which was required 
to be redeemed by the seller on a certain date to be a usurious loan disguised under the 
mere name of census. See NOONAN, supra note 12, at 158-62. 
245 HOMER AND SYLLA, supra note II, at 74-75; ACKERMAN, supra note I, at 76. 
246 !d. 
247 McCALL, supra note 10, at 583-85. 
248 !d. 
249 HOMER AND SYLLA, supra note II, at 74-75 (4th ed. 2005); ACKERMAN, supra note I, 
at 76. 
250 !d. 
251 !d. 
252 ACKERMAN, supra note I, at 76-77. 
253 ACKERMAN, supra note I, at 77. 
A spinoff from the medieval pawnshop254 was the "mons pietatis."255 Subsidized 
by the state or charitable contributions, the mons pietatis was a pawnshop run for the 
benefit of the poor.256 The interest charge was a low 6%.257 Despite clerical misgivings, 
Pope Paul II approved the scheme on the theory that the charge was not profit but only 
enough to cover the cost of operation.Z58 The institution spread throughout Europe, 
gradually expanding its sphere of activity to include business loans and even deposit 
banking.259 
Islamic banks function very similarly to regular commercial banks in that they 
must fix their financial rate of returns ("ROR") at the onset for most of their businesses 
(which is essentially prohibited under Shari'ah).26° Currently, many money lending 
institutions making loans to the Muslim community are adopting the same approaches 
used in the Middle Ages to defeat the usury prohibition in Islam.261 
The fundamental reason for the prohibition of interest in Islam is that the 
depositor should not profit unduly from the hard work and risk bearing of others. 262 To a 
Western-trained economist, a competitively determined market interest rate serves an 
254 ACKERMAN, supra note 1, at 77 (1981); HOMER AND SYLLA, supra note JJ, at 74-76 
(Pawnshops, generally operated by Jews (who were unaffected by excommunication), 
were tolerated as a necessary evil. These pawnshops provided needed funds to borrowers 
and a lucrative source of revenue to the state in the form of license fees and special taxes. 
The rates were high: legal limits varied from 30% to 300%). 
255 ACKERMAN, supra note 1, at 76-77. HOMER AND SYLLA, supra note 11, at 74-76. 
256 !d. 
2s1 Id. 
258 !d. 
259 !d. 
260 Scheherazade S. Rehman, PhD, Globalization of Islamic Finance Law, 25 Wis. Int'l 
L.J. 625, 634 (2008). 
261 MAHMOUD A. EL-GAMAL, iSLAMIC FINANCE: LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PRACTICE 62 
(2006). 
262 REHMAN, supra note 260, at 634. 
indispensable function in a market economy. 263 Interest rates affect savings and 
investment and efficiently allocate capital from where it is plentiful to where it is 
scarce.
264 In competitive markets, this allocation of capital is achieved most efficiently; 
namely, capital is attracted to where it will earn the highest rate of return ("ROR").265 
Moreover, interest rates offer policymakers an important instrument for macroeconomic 
management. Although Islam prohibits interest (riba), it encourages profit and return 
from investment where the investor takes calculated risk. Thus financial institutions can 
offer an investor a share of their annual profits (and losses) in proportion to the investor's 
deposit (the share of an individual's deposit relative to total assets of the bank). This rate 
of return to the investor is different from interest in two important ways: a priori its size 
is unknown (there are no guarantees); and the investor has to take more of a risk (in a 
Western system the depositor takes less of a risk because the capital of the financial 
institution's stockholders is first at risk before the capital of the depositors). 
263 It must be emphasized here that the only way to achieve a true understanding of 
Islamic banking and finance is to not look at the Islamic system through "Western eyes." 
In other words, to fully understand Islamic banking and finance, it is necessary to 
understand Islam from a broadly encompassing perspective. An excerpt from DeSeife's 
book on the Shari'ah may help clarify this point: "Much has been written on Islamic law 
... [y Jet often, because the perspective of most Americans is not grounded in an adequate 
knowledge oflslam, misconceptions abound, particularly as to the real meaning of the 
Shar'ia ... Viewed as a system of law without the context of the religious and ethical 
provisions of the Qur'an, the Shar'ia may strike us as a throwback to the medieval times 
when witches were burned at the stake in Christian countries." RODOLPHE J.A. DESEIFE, 
THE SHAR'tA: AN iNTRODUCTION To THE LAW OF iSLAM I (1994). 
264 EL-GAMAL, supra note 256, at 63. 
265 !d. 
In essence, the modern day practice of avoiding riba is similar to the Contractum 
Trinius266 as can been seen in, for example, Islamic "murabaha" contract.267 This Islamic 
mortgage financing contract looks very much like Contractum Trinius (two separate 
contracts for one project so it becomes Shari'ah-compliant).268 Murabaha works 
essentially as follows: in the Western financial tradition, if a person wishes to finance the 
purchase of an item, he or she goes to the bank and asks for a loan at a set rate of interest, 
which is paid back over time. The bank typically gets a lien on the item until it is paid 
off.269 With murabaha, the bank buys the item and then "sells" it to the customer at cost 
plus.Z70 The "plus" is the bank's profit, and works the same as a rate ofinterest.271 The 
customer, who does not have the money to pay immediately for the total value, plus 
profit, of the item, pays over time.272 The payments include the principal amount of the 
purchase price, plus the profit, in installments.273 This has exactly the same effect as a 
traditional equipment-financing loan, where the principal plus the interest are amortized 
and paid back to the bank over the life of the loan. Understanding this, a bank that offers 
these products does not tend to make the text of such types of contracts readily available 
to outsiders and uninterested parties.274 These contracts also tend to be drafted very 
266 Latin for a three-part contract of good faith. See, TAREK EL DIWANY, ISLAMIC 
BANKING ISN'T ISLAMIC, lslamicFinance.com, http://www.islamic-
finance.com/itemlOO_f.htm. See REHMAN, supra note 260, at 635. 
267 REHMAN, supra note 260, at 635. 
268 !d. at 635. 
269 !d. at 635. 
270 
271 
272 J. MICHAEL TAYLOR, ISLAMIC BANKING-lHE FEAS/8/UTY OF ESlABLISHING AN ISLAMIC 
BANK IN THE UV!TEDSTATES, 40 AM. BUS. L.J. 385, 395 (2003). 
273 
274 
strictly and tightly to ensure that the bank does not lose money on the deal if the 
beneficiary defaults (as Shari'ah-compliance mandates profit/loss sharing).275 
There are many other examples of similar Islamic Contractum Trinius type 
contracts. In investment financing, for example, to list just a few, there are the 
mudaraba,276 musharaka,277 bai'muajjal,278 and ijara, and bai'salam modes of 
financing. 279 Musharaka financial transactions were known and practiced among the 
Arabs before Islam, were continued during and after the life of the Prophet Mohammed, 
and thus are considered by many scholars to be the most authentic form oflslamic 
finance.Z 8° Critics have complained that the banks are following the letter of the law 
instead of the spirit of the law.281 They argue that combining Islamically permissible 
contracts to produce interest-bearing loans is the heart of the modem day financial 
specialization oflslamic banking--and that, they contend, is a violation of Shari'ah law.Z82 
They are quick to point out that "economic and social justice," a key tenant in Islam, 
recognizes capital as a factor of production, but just not the excessive use of it on a 
"down-trodden man." 283 
275 
276 TAYLOR, supra note 257, at 392. 
277 
278 
279 REHMAN, supra note 251, at 634. 
280 !d. at 636. 
281 
282 
283 
According to religious obligations proscribed by Islamic law, Muslims who 
practice Islam are prevented from using some conventional financial products.284 Shari'a 
(Islamic law) prohibits paying or receiving riba,285 which is often translated as interest, 
but may be better understood as theory of unjust enrichment.286 Riba has also been 
defined as "unlawful advantage by way of excess or deferment."287 Prohibitions ofriba in 
the Qur'an seek to prevent usurious conditions in exchanges and loans.288 "As a result, 
legal transactions are restricted to exchanges of literal equality, like barter and sale: dollar 
for dollar, with no adjustment for time-value."289 Usurious conditions (usury) could occur 
where there is an increase on an initial capital sum, whether because it is bargained for or 
b h d . fi . 290 ecause t ere are ate-uncertam uture transactwns. 
The classical view adopted in many Islamic law jurisdictions is that the interest 
component in financial transactions, a feature entrenched in Western financing schemes, 
is completely prohibited.291 A more modern view, however, makes allowances for some 
types of excess in financial dealings by assigning money no intrinsic value, therefore 
allowing interest on money, excess on a loan, or excess on another exchange to fall 
284 MARY-PATRICIA E. WRA Y, FREE EXERCist· AND COMPULSORY INSURANCE: THE FUTURE 
OF MANDATORY FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND RELIGIOUS OBSERVANCE, 12 LOY. J. PUB. 
INT. L 239,246 (2010). 
285 !d. ("The root of the Arabic word riba (transliterated as the English-language letters r, 
b, and w) signifies 'increase.' The grammatical form of riba, a verbal noun, means 
'excess, increase, augmentation, expansion or growth."' BARBARA L. SENIA WSKI, RIBA 
TODAY: SOCIAL EQUITY, THE ECONOMY, AND DOING BUSINESS UNDER ISLAMIC LAW, 39 
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 701,707 (2001).) 
286 I d. fRANK E. VOGEL & SAMUEL L. HAYES, !II, ISLAMIC LAW & FINANCE: RELIGION, 
RISK & RETURN 84 (1998). 
287 Id. 
288 Jd. 
289 !d. 
290 !d. 
291 !d. at 247. 
outside the scope of the prohibited riba.292 For example, under a more modem view, one 
allowance often made in the modem globalized economy is a modest interest rate, 
consistent with or less than the rate of inflation. 293 
SHARI' AH COMPLIANT BANKING AND FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS 
In order to provide interest-free banking and financial services to the Muslim 
community, Islamic banks practice certain methods within defined areas of operation.Z94 
There are three general areas of operation for Islamic banks: (I) non-fund transactions, 
(2) investment activities, and (3) social activities.295 
Non-fund transactions are similar to the service-oriented transactions of 
conventional banks. Transactions from current accounts, savings accounts, and 
investment accounts are generally considered non-fund transactions.296 In these accounts, 
the bank does not give interest, and they are, in essence, "a safekeeping (al-wadiah) 
arrangement between the depositors and the bank, which allows the depositors to 
withdraw their money at any time and permits the bank to use depositors' money."297 
Investment activities (which are the most pertinent to this discussion) involve the 
use of a variety of mechanisms in order to gather fmancial resources and to provide 
capital financing to "provide finance for trade, industry, and agriculture."298 The most 
292 ld. (See also ZIAUL HAQUE, RIBA: THE MORAL ECONOMY OF USURY, iNTEREST AND 
PROFIT48-50 (2D ED. 1995) (explaining the historical practices creating distinction 
between riba al-fadl and riba al-nasi'a).) 
293 !d. 
294 SHAHID HASSAN SIDDIQUI, ISlAMIC BANKING: GENESIS & RATIONALE, EVALUATION & 
REVIEW, PROSPECTS & CHALLENGr;S 71 (1994). 
295 !d. at 52. 
296 SHARAWY,supra note 148, at 168 (2000). 
297 Id. 
298 SIDDIQUI, supra note 294, at 52. 
commonly used modes of investment activities in Islamic banking are mudaraba, 
musharaka, murabaha, bai'muajjal, ijara, and bai'salam.299 
Mudaraba is generally equivalent to tbe type of transaction in conventional 
finance known as venture capitalism?00 Mudaraba allows the entrepreneur witb a 
business plan to make use of an investor's capital.301 Here, tbe owner of capital, i.e., the 
investor, shares in tbe profit earned by tbe entrepreneur and bears any losses on his own. 
The scheme designates the entrepreneur as a type of agent for tbe investor or investors so 
that those owning tbe capital entrust the entrepreneur with it. 302 In exchange for tbe use 
of the capital, the entrepreneur agrees to give a specified share of future profits to tbe 
investors, who in tum are exclusively responsible for any loss to the capital while in the 
care ofthe entrepreneur. 303 
Though this arrangement seemingly circumvents the prohibition of riba, it 
appears in conflict with tbe notion of equal risk allocation. After all, only the owner of 
capital assumes the risk ofloss while both share in tbe venture's profits. Perhaps, the 
discrepancy in loss can be justified by the fact that the borrower in a mudaraba 
299 SHARAWY,supra note 148, at 168. 
300 See FUAD AL-0MAR & MOHAMMED ABDEL-HAQ, ISLAMIC BANKING: THEORY, 
PRACTICE & CHALLENGES 12-13 (1996); JANE CONNORS, TOWARDS A SYSTEM OF ISLAMIC 
FINANCE IN MALAYSIA, I.V ISLAMIC LAW AND FINANCE 58-59 (CHIBLI MALLA TED., 1988); 
NABIL A. SALEH, UNLAWFUL GAIN AND LEGI7JMATE PROFIT IN ISLAMIC LAW: RIBA, GHARAR 
AND ISLAMIC BANKING I 03 (1986); GOHAR BILAL, ISLAMIC FINANC!i: ALTERNATIVES TO THE 
WESTERN MODEL, 23 fLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 145, !56 (1999). Mudaraba is often 
referred to as "trust-financing" in the literature on Islamic banking. 
301 SHARAWY, supra note 148, at 168 (The owner of capital is referred to in Arabic as the 
"rabbulmal", literally the "owner of the capital." The entrepreneur borrower is known as 
the "mudarib"). 
302 SHARAWY, supra note 148, at 168; SEE SHAHRUKH RAFI KHAN, PROFIT AND LOSS 
SHARING: AN ISLAMIC EXPERIMENT IN FINANCE AND BANKING 79 (1987) (describing one of 
the theories of the revival of Islamic banking as tbe result ofthe new-found wealth 
among the Muslim OPEC members). 
303 !d. 
transaction risks the loss of his time and effort so that the two parties are not simply 
profit -sharing, but "profit and loss sharing. "304 In this manner, both investor and 
entrepreneur benefit from a transaction in which one risks loss of capital while the other 
risks loss of the more metaphysical capital--that of time and effort. To further add to its 
appeal, the mudaraba transaction was approved and practiced by the Prophet, according 
to Islamic jurists.305 
Another alternative to interest based investments is musharaka, the Islamic 
equivalent of the capitalistic partnership arrangement.306 In the musharaka transaction, 
partners contribute capital to the partnership, sharing profits and losses according to an 
agreed-upon formula based on the contribution of each partner. 307 Islamic banks are 
involved in both mudaraba and musharaka transactions. In a mudaraba transaction, the 
bank acts as a "mudarib", or borrower, managing the funds of the depositors to generate 
profits.308 It thereby operates on a "two-tier mudaraba system in which it acts both as the 
mudarib on the saving side of the equation and as the "rabbulmal" ("investor") on the 
investment portfolio side." 309 Further, the bank may also enter irtto a profit and loss 
sharing scheme with its customers according to the musharaka formulation by using 
deposited funds. 310 
304 TAYLOR, supra note 257, at 397. 
305 Id. 
306 MUSHFIQUE SHAMS BILLAH, ARAB MONEY: WHY ISN'T THE UNITED STATES GETTING 
ANY?, 32 U. PA. J. INT'L L. 1055, 1068 (2011). 
307 !d. 
308 !d. 
309 CHIAN Wu, ISLAMIC BANKING: SIGNS OF SUSTAINABLE GROWTH, 16 MINN. J. lNT'L L. 
233,233-34 (2007) (exploring the feasibility of interest-free Islamic finance in a global 
market that is dominated by interest-bearing transactions). 
310 !d. 
The mudaraba and musharaka modes of finance theoretically constitute the 
primary methods of financing in Islamic banking, but in practice, they are considered 
quite risky. As a result, other less risky methods are used more often. 311 
Another mode of financing commonly used by Islamic banks is "ba'i bithaman 
ajil" ("Deferred Payment Financing").312 Ba'i bithaman ajil involves a credit sale of 
goods on a deferred payment basis. At the request of its customer, the financial institution 
purchases an existing contract to buy certain assets on a deferred payment schedule and 
then sells the goods back to the customer at an agreed upon price, including a profit.313 
The payments by the financial institution to the original supplier of the goods are 
progressive, as the goods are manufactured or purchased. The financial institution's 
customer "can repay in lump sum or make installment payments over an agreed-upon 
period."314 
"ljara" is yet another form of finance that does not involve riba and is commonly 
used by Islamic banks when equipment and machinery are involved. 315 In the ijara, or 
lease transaction, the bank is the owner of the machinery or equipment and the clients pay 
a fixed amount for its use.316 The lessee can buy the equipment from the bank and thus 
the installments would include both the rental and purchase fees of the equipment. 317 
311 SHARA WY, supra note 281, at 168. 
312 TAYLOR, supra note 257, at 393. 
313 !d. 
314 !d. 
315 BILAL, supra note 300, at 146. (SEE AL-0MAR & ABDEL-HAQ, supra note 300, at xvi) 
( detining ijara as "an arrangement under which the Islamic bank leases equipment, a 
building or other facility to a client, against an agreed rental. The rent is so fixed that the 
bank gets back its original investment plus a profit on it."). 
316 !d. 
317 TAYLOR, supra note 257, at 393. 
One of the final methods of financing used by Islamic banks where the sale of 
goods is involved is known as "bai'salam ".318 In a bai'salam transaction, the goods 
purchased are paid for in advance at the time of execution of the contract. But, delivery of 
the goods is delayed until a later date.319 "This mode enables an entrepreneur to sell his 
output to a bank at a price determined in advance. "320 
It is clear from the above modes of financing that Islamic banking has established 
creative methods of financing in order to foster economic growth within the Muslim 
community without compromising the goals oflslam. In fact, these methods foster the 
goals of Islam. Although these methods represent the majority of financing methods in 
Islam, they are by no means exhaustive, nor do they represent the outer limits of the 
development of other alternatives to traditional modes of banking and finance. 
Furthermore, as critics within the Islamic community dissect the methods in terms of 
Shari'ah compliance, there is the possibility that the methods may change. 
The financial tools set forth above serve to promote the growth of principal 
without implicating the forbidden use of riba.321 Notably, not all of these tools are 
available in the banking system of the United States, but some are remarkably similar to 
financial vehicles approved by banking regulators, and thus, may be utilized in 
conformance with existing regulations. 
In a nutshell, Islamic finance is based on the trade of productive assets, the 
sharing of risks in the development of projects, the promotion of entrepreneurship and the 
318 SHARAWY, supra note 281, at 169. 
319 Id. (See BILAL, supra note 300, at 146) (discussing the possibility of advance or 
deferred payments under an "istisna" ("commissioned manufacturing") contract). 
32o Id. 
321 TAYLOR, supra note 257, at 393. 
provision of social benefits to those who are often exploited by lenders.322 The continuing 
growth of Islamic finance as an alternate system to conventional finance creates 
competition, which is beneficial to borrowers.323 Additionally, this growing financial 
sector offers an additional avenue for raising funds from Muslim investors by allowing 
consumers and financiers to choose financial instruments that are compatible with their 
business needs, social values and religious beliefs.324 
CONCLUSION 
Skeptics may argue that principles developed in a different economic environment 
are irreconcilable with the modern economy. Scholastic usury principles just cannot 
function today. The rise oflslamic finance in recent decades, however, may prove this 
objection incorrect. The Islamic approach to usury, which prohibits the charging of riba 
or profit on loans but permits profit-sharing on investment in productive activities,325 
bears striking similarities to the scholastic theory.326 While in the West the scholastic 
theory has not yet been applied to modern banking and finance, Islamic theory has been 
able to adapt modern banking products to its usury proscriptions.327 
322 BJLAL, supra note 300, at 153. 
323 !d. 
324 !d. 
325 Karasik et al., supra note 15, at 383-85. 
326 Id. at381. 
327 
"What appears apparent, however, is that Christian financial corporations and ethicists 
have yet to provide a systematic approach to financial relationships and ethics for the 
modern economy that re-imagines and rearticulates core religious teachings on finance. 
Islamic financial institutions have spent ov.er three decades developing financial products 
modelled [sic] for the modern economy that, never the less, incorporate and reference 
long-established religious ethics and prohibitions." CONSTANT J. MEWS & IBRAHIM 
ABRAHAM, USURY AND JUST COMPENSATION: RELIGIOUS AND FINANCIAL ETHICS IN 
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE, 72 J. Bus. ETHICS I, II (2007). 
The usury prohibition was at the center of the conflict between the forces of the 
market economy, on the one hand, and the religious-supported values of community on 
the other. It was a focus not only of intellectual concern, but also of popular fervor, 
because it became a symbol of resistance to the values of commercial society. It had an 
extraordinary impact because it was not merely a norm, but also the description of a form 
of evil. 
Because of its symbolic poignancy and deep penetration of society, the usury 
norm served a central perceptual function. It structured the ways in which people 
perceived the commercialization process, reinforcing the image of the moneylender as a 
vile enemy of the community and underscoring the need to protect the weak from 
exploitation. 
The usury prohibition was also a central context for the development of economic 
thought. According to John T. Noonan, "the scholastic theory of usury is an embryonic 
theory of economics ... [and] the first attempt at a science of economics known to the 
West."328 Intellectuals were faced with the task of reconciling traditional values with the 
needs of the newly-emerging mercantile component of society, and it was in this context 
that they began to examine economic processes in a systematic way. 
Finally, the usury prohibition also affected the development of economic patterns. 
People went to great lengths to avoid being classified as usurers. Henceforth, merchants 
developed partnership and other risk -sharing devices in order to test the limits of the 
usury doctrine and achieve the financing objectives of the loan without being categorized 
as usurers. 
328 NOONAN, supra note 12, at 2. 


